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Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its rulings on the fifth amendment
protection against double jeopardy,' the Supreme
Court has held that implicated in that protection
is "a defendant's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal.",2 The right to
a single adjudication of guilt or innocence before
a single tribunal, however, has never been accorded
the same absolute status in double jeopardy consid-
erations as has the finality of a verdict of acquittal,
rendered on the merits of a case. The Supreme
Court has developed a number of exceptions to the
"single tribunal" rule. These exceptions have been
based on such concerns as the public's interest in
fair trials3 and the state's interest in legitimate state
policies.4
The ambiguities in the status of the right to a
complete trial before one discrete factfinder have
been increased by two cases decided by the Su-
preme Court in the 1977 term, which interpret
and, to some extent, restrict that right. In Arizona
v. Washington,5 the Court held that a mistrial de-
clared by the trial judge, based on improper re-
marks by defense counsel in his opening statement,
did not bar retrial due to former jeopardy, even
though the defendant objected to the mistrial rul-
ing. In previous cases where reprosecution after a
I"[Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... "
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,689 (1949). The Wade
Court went on to note, however, that this valued right
was subordinate in some cases to the public's interest in
fair trials and just judgments. The court held that a
second trial was not barred in a court-martial proceeding
which was transferred from the Third to the Fifteenth
Army due to military exigencies created by the invasion
of Germany.
3id.
4 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The state
policy which, according to the Court, outweighed the
defendant's interest in a continuing trial, was the require-
ment under Illinois law that the defendant in a criminal
case be tried only on indictment of a grand jury. This
policy prevented a mid-trial amendment of a defective
indictment and necessitated a mistrial.
5 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
mistrial was held not to have violated the double
jeopardy clause, the Court based its decision on
either a jusifiable finding of manifest necessity by
the trial judge6 or the defendant's own election of
mistrial. Arizona v. Washington made two significant
departures from these standards. First, the Court
drew an implication of manifest necessity from the
facts of the case without any relevent specific find-
ings by the trial judge. Second, the Court added a
new ground upon which the finding of manifest
necessity could be based: misconduct by the de-
fense attorney.s That particular rationale for de-
claring a mistrial falls uncomfortably close to the
risk of abuse which gave rise to the prohibition
against reprosecution following a mistrial?
In Swisher v. Brady,10 the second important related
case of this term, the Court held that the juvenile
trial system of Baltimore, Maryland did not violate
the double jeopardy constraints of the fifth amend-
ment by allowing a state's attorney to take excep-
tions to a master's proposed finding of non-delin-
quency and to demand a hearing on the record by
a supervising judge. The Court determined that a
defendant's right to one trial before a single fact-
6Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Simmons v. United
States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
7 United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
8 The trial court in Dinitz also based its mistrial ruling
on misconduct by the defense attorney. However, in that
case the defendant was given a choice of accepting a
mistrial or proceeding with his other counsel conducting
the case. The defendant opted for a mistrial and the
Supreme Court based its ruling that the defendant's
valued right to a single trial was not offended on the
ground that the mistrial ruling was at the behest of the
defendant. The Court did not consider the issue of
whether misconduct by the defendant's attorney could
provide the basis for a ruling of manifest necessity that
would justify declaring a mistrial over the defendant's
objection. Id at 601-11.
9 The original basis for prohibiting a retrial after the
declaration of a mistrial was to prevent a judge or
prosecutor from aborting a trial when it appeared likely
that the jury intended to acquit a defendant who the
state believed was guilty. 434 U.S. at 507-08.
'098 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
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finding body was not violated by Baltimore's pres-
ent system, for, as the Court reasoned, the judge
and master system constituted an ongoing process
and not two discrete trials. Finally, the Court noted
that none of the underlying reasons for the prohi-
bition against repeated trials were implicated in
the Maryland system. This decision calls into seri-
ous question the status of this "valued right"" to
one trial before a single factfinding body and con-
fuses the definition of a single tribunal.
The doctrinal history of the defendant's right to
protection against repeated trials, even where those
trials fail to end in a verdict, provides insight into
the ambiguity inherent in the status of that right.
In English law, the doctrine was not part of the
double jeopardy prohibition; instead, it was a rule
ofjury practice, 12 which mandated that once ajury.
was impaneled, it could not be dismissed. The rule
evolved, however, into a protection against the
abusive judicial and prosecutorial practice of dis-
charging a jury whenever an acquittal seemed
likely.3 In American law, the protection was in-
corporated into the double jeopardy rule through
United States v. Perez14 and Wade v. Hunter.15
The policies underlying the prevention of mul-
" 336 U.S. at 689.
12 The rule arose in the context of hung juries. Civil as
well as criminal juries were required to remain impaneled
until they rendered a verdict. Crist v. Bretz, U.S. 98 S.
Ct. 2156, 2163-64 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
'3 Id. at 2164.
14 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579. Doublejeopardy was not
explicitly mentioned in the case. The Court simply held
that retrials are not barred by a mistrial declared on the
basis of a hung jury as long as there was a manifest
necessity for the discharge of the jury. The following
language, however, has been repeatedly quoted by the
courts in ruling on the double jeopardy implications of a
mistrial:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law
has invested Courts of justice with the authority to
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on
the subject; and it is impossible to define all the
circumstances, which would render it proper to
interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used
with the greatest caution under urgent circum-
stances, and for very plain and obvious causes... .
But, after all, they have the right to order the
discharge; and the security which the public have
for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of
this discretion, rests, in this as in other cases, upon
the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of
office.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
15 336 U. S. at 689.
tiple prosecutions for the same offense serve equally
well as a rationale for guaranteeing the defendant
a single trial before a single factfinding body. The
policies involved in each of these aspects of double
jeopardy reflect a judgment that actual guilt or
innocence, rather than the overwhelming resources
of the government, should determine the outcome
of a trial. Guilt should be established by one trial
conducted in the adversary tradition and should
not be the result of the "odds" that at least one of
several factfinders who hear the case will be per-
suaded by the prosecutor. Moreover, successive
prosecutions can easily become a weapon for har-
assment in the hands of the government or a means
of punishing an uncooperative defendant. Finally,
multiple prosecutions allow the state an opportu-
nity to refine its evidence so that it can present a
better case at subsequent trials.' 6
As both the Arizona and Swisher cases indicate,
however, the right to be tried by a single tribunal
does not receive the same treatment by the courts
as does the protection against a subsequent prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction or
acquittal. The protection against reprosecution
after acquittal is absolute. But, the right to a trial
before a single tribunal is subject to a balancing of
interests, because "at times the valued right of a
defendant to have his trial completed by the par-
ticular tribunal summoned to sit in judgment on
him may be subordinated to the public interest
when there is an imperious necessity to do so.
'17
THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING THE
PERMISSIBILITY OF REPROSECUTION AFTER A
MISTRIAL
In Arizona v. Washington,'8 the Supreme Court
applied the "manifest necessity" standard in deter-
16 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The
court said:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system ofjurispru-
dence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though in-
nocent, he may be found guilty.
335 U.S. at 187. See also 75 YA1. L.J. 262 (1965).
17 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
"The defendant in Arizona v. Washington was being
tried for the murder of a hotel night clerk. His original
conviction was overturned when the prosecution withheld
exculpatory materials to which the defendant was enti-
tled under the Supreme Court ruling in Brady v. Mary-
[Vol. 69
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mining that the public's interest in a fair trial
outweighed the defendant's right to pursue a ver-
dict from the original jury at a single trial. The
Court ruled that it was possible to imply from the
facts of the case that a mistrial had been necessi-
tated by d.'nse counsel's improper and possibly
prejudicial opening remarks. In Arizona, defense
counsel had commented on the fact that the de-
fendant's initial conviction had been overturned
because the prosecution had withheld exculpatory
evidence.19 The trial judge granted the prosecutor's
motion for a mistrial over defense counsel's oppo-
sition. In opposition to the motion, defense counsel
had asserted that any prejudicial impact of his
statement could be cured by instructing the jury to
disregard it. But, in granting the mistrial, the trial
court made no explicit finding of necessity and
gave no more than a minimal indication2o on the
record before the Supreme Court that the judge
had considered the question of necessity or the
possibility of alternatives.
The district court, in granting defendant's peti-
tion for habeas corpus,2 felt that the controlling
factor was the absence of an explicit finding of
manifest necessity.22 The court of appeals affirmed,
but disagreed with the district court's emphasis on
the need for a formal finding of manifest neces-
sity.23 Instead, the Ninth Circuit based its ruling
on the absence of any indication on the record that
the state trial court had even considered the neces-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). During the second trial, the
judge declared a mistrial based on an improper reference
to the prosecution's conduct by the defense counsel in his
opening statement.
" You will hear testimony that notwithstanding
the fact that we had a trial in May of 1971 in this
matter that the prosecutor hid those statements and
didn't give those to the lawyer for George saying the
man was Spanish speaking, didn't give those state-
ments at all, hid them.
You will hear that that evidence was suppressed
and hidden by the prosecutor in that case. You will
hear that that evidence was purposely withheld.
You will hear that because of the misconduct of the
County Attorney at that time and because he with-
held evidence, that the Supreme Court of Arizona
granted a new trial in this case. App. 180-81, 184.
434 U.S. at 499.
2DId at 501.
21 In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the
Court applied the double jeopardy prohibition to the
states through the fourteenth amendment and hence a
federal habeas corpus review of a state double jeopardy
decision could be permitted.
2 434 U.S. at 502 n.8.
2' Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.
1976).
sity for a mistrial or the possible alternatives. The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that a finding of manifest necessity could be im-
plied from the record. The Court reasoned that the
court of appeals had used an overly exacting and
technical standard and had failed to give proper
deference to the trial judge who had been "in the
best position to assess all the factors which must be
considered in making a necessarily discretionary
determination whether the jury will be able to
reach a just verdict if it continues to deliberate.
' ' 4
In Perez v. United States,?s the Supreme Court first
articulated the standard of manifest necessity as
the basis for allowing reprosecutions after mistrials.
The Court in Perez faced the classic mistrial situa-
tion, that of a hung jury, and decided that retrial
.would not be barred if "there is a manifest necessity
for the act or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated. ' 'as Subsequently, the mani-
fest necessity requirement was held to have been
met in cases involving possible jury bias due to
outside events2 and in a case involving a court
martial where the exigencies of war interfered with
the summoning of witnesses.28 These cases gave the
requirement the flavor of outside interference or
circumstances beyond the control of the parties, an
impression which was strengthened by Downum v.
United States.2 In Downun, the Court refused to find
that a mistrial was manifestly necessary where a
prosecutor had been unable to locate a witness, a
fact of which he had been aware prior to the
beginning of the trial.
However, in Go" v. Uited States,3' decided prior
to Doumnm, the Court held that a mistrial did not
bar further prosecution when it was a result of an
improper line of questioning by the prosecutor.
The Court in God emphasized the discretionary
nature of such a ruling and the fact that, in this
case, it worked in favor of, rather than against the
defendant's interests.?' Goni was thus the first case
to indicate that the determination of whether or
not the defendant's interests were being served by
a mistrial should be considered in questioning the
24 434 US. at 510 n.28.
2 22 US. (9 Wheat.) at 579.
27Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).t5 Wade v- Hunter, 336 US. 684 (1949).
372 U.S. 734 (1963).
'367 U.S. 364 (1961).
31The court emphasized that retrial after mistrials
would be barred primarily in cases where the mistrial
worked against the defendant. Id at 368-69.
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necessity of the mistrial ruling. This emphasis in
Gori on the discretionary nature of the mistrial
ruling was cited in Illinois v. Somerville,32 where a
judge aborted a trial because of a defective indict-
ment. The Supreme Court in Somerville reiterated
its holding that the judge had broad discretion,
and although the mistrial was not declared solely
in the defendant's own interests as it had been in
Gori, the mistrial ruling did further a legitimate
state policy against amending indictments in mid-
trial. With a defective indictment, the Court as-
serted, there was no reason to continue the trial
because any guilty verdict obtained could be over-
turned at will on appeal. The dissent argued ve-
hemently that the Court majority had failed to
take into account the defendant's right to pursue
a verdict of acquittal, a right the Court did not
include in its balancing process.ss
Prior to this term, the most recent case involving
the issue of double jeopardy implications of a
mistrial was United States v. Dinitz.3' In that case,
the trial judge had made misconduct by the de-
fendant's attorney the basis for the mistrial ruling.
However, the Court decided the case on the ground
that the mistrial was the defendant's own choice,
based on three options given him by the trial
judge.s The Court ruled that the manifest neces-
sity standard was therefore not applicable to the
case.
Arizona v. Washington is the first case to present
squarely to the Supreme Court the issue of whether
a mistrial caused by defense counsel's misconduct
and declared over the defendant's objection bars
reprosecution on the basis of double jeopardy. Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that the
double jeopardy provision provides protection
against the practice of declaring a mistrial because
the judge or prosecutor fears the defendant may be
acquitted. The danger of this type of ruling led the
Court to apply the strictest type of scrutiny to
mistrials declared on the basis of the unavailability
of prosecutorial evidence or when there is a suspi-
cion of narassment or tactical maneuvering by the
3410 U.S. at 462.
3 Id. at 473-83 (White, J., dissenting).
4424 U.S. 600 (1976).
an Id at 608. The Court in Dinitz cited United. States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), where the Court had stated
that a defendant's own motion for mistrial could not bar
subsequent prosecution unless necessitated by prosecu-
torial or judicial misconduct. Id at 606. In Jon, the
Supreme Court ruled, in a plurality opinion, that a trial
judge who failed to exercise scrupulously his discretion in
declaring a mistrial had failed to meet the Perez standard
of manifest necessity and that a subsequent prosecution
would be barred.
prosecutor36 The Court went on to note that at the
opposite end of the spectrum are cases involving
hung juries. In these cases, a trial judge's ruling
would be entitled to great deference. According to
the Court, the trial judge is in the best position to
assess the situation and thus should not be tempted
to force the jury to return an improper verdict by
his fear that a mistrial ruling would bar any further
prosecution. 7
The Court then applied its new analysis of the
standards for reviewing the manifest necessity of a
mistrial ruling to the type of situation which gave
rise to the mistrial in Arizona v. Washington. Mistrials
based on defense counsel misconduct were held to
be analogous to those involving possible jury bias.
Therefore, Arizona's factual circumstances were re-
viewed under the Court's policy of giving great
deference to the trial judge's analysis of the situa-
tion.3s It was not, according to the Court, the type
of situation which called for strict scrutiny of the
trial judge's decision. The Court found that the
record in Arizona showed that the trial judge acted
deliberately, responsibly, and in the exercise of
sound discretion. The Court therefore dismissed as
unimportant the failure of the state court to make
any finding on the necessity for the mistrial, hold-
ing that such a finding could be implied from the
record .39
The Court's decision did not pass without dis-
sent. Justice White filed one of the two dissents and
noted that since the district court applied the
incorrect legal standard to the facts, the case should
be remanded to that court and not decided by the
Supreme Court in the first instance.4° Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the
belief that it was improper to imply a finding of
manifest necessity from a record which failed to
indicate any consideration of alternatives or of the
necessity for a mistrial on the part of the trial
judge." Marshall felt that a curative instruction
could very possibly have dissipated any prejudicial
effect of the prosecutor's remarks and that the
failure of the Arizona State court to consider such
an alternative indicated that there was no sound
exercise of discretion on its part relative to the
necessity of the mistrial.42 Marshall believed that
requiring on the record some indication that the
judge had considered the necessity for a mistrial
434 U.S. at 508.
37 Id. at 509.
3 Id. 508.
3Id. at 516.
4 Id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Id at 521-22.
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would insure that the judge would not overlook
this concern in making 'his mistrial ruling and
would, additionally, facilitate appellate review.
4 3
In analyzing the importance of Arizona v. Wash-
ington to the development of the double jeopardy
doctrine iivecked in mistrial rulings, it is important
to note that prior to the case, mistrial rulings
reviewed by the Supreme Court were generally
addressed to the subject of juror bias or prosecu-
torial misconduct or negligence. Apart from the
ruling in Dinitz, which hinged on the mistrial being
at the option of the defendant, misconduct on the
part of the defendant or defense attorney had not
been the basis for declaring a mistrial.44 In deciding
Arizona, however, the Court has, for the first time,
categorized its former decisions on mistrials into
two groups, cases which require strict scrutiny and
cases in which the trial judge's ruling will be given
greater deference. The basis asserted by the Court
for this variation in the standard of review is that
certain types of cases offer more likelihood of abuse
by the prosecutor or by the judge in attempts to
prevent an acquittal.
With Arizona, the Court has placed defense mis-
conduct among those situations where it is appro-
priate to pay deference to the ruling of the trial
court. Previous cases cited by the Court warranting
such deference to trial court mistrial rulings were
those involving jury bias or hung juries, wherein
an unfair conviction was the likely outcome unless
the trial was aborted. The rationale for allowing
the trial judge this larger measure of discretion was
that these situations did not lend themselves to the
type of judicial or prosecutorial abuse which wasthe asisfor45
the basis for the double jeopardy concern. These
situations were neither provoked by the prosecution
to avoid a possible acquittal, nor were they the
result of a judge's decision to end the trial simply
because the jury appeared ready to acquit a de-
fendant whom the judge believed was guilty. The
common basis for the judge's ruling in the hung
jury and jury bias cases was the possibility of an
unfair conviction which could be overturned on
appeal, wasting the time and money of all the
parties.
On the other hand, prosecutorial misconduct
situations have been strictly scrutinized because of
a Court fear that the prosecutor intended his acts
43 Id. at 526-27.
"See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894); Simmons v. United
States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
45 434 U.S. at 508.
to provoke a mistrial and thereby deprive the
defendant of his right to pursue a verdict of ac-
quittal.46 Likewise, mistrial rulings for which there
is no apparent necessity and which indicate a lack
of discrimination on the part of the judge should
be subject to strict scrutiny for the same reason.
Such rulings tend to lend themselves to the abusive
practice of declaring a mistrial whenever acquittal
seems likely.
The Court, without any extended analysis,
placed the situation giving rise to the ruling in
Arizona within the class of situations including jury
bias and hung juries. While it is true that the basis
for the judge's declaration of mistrial was the pos-
sible prejudice to the jury, the key to the proper
analysis of these particular facts should have been
the attempt by the judge to prevent an unfair
acquittal. Like the situation of prosecutorial mis-
conduct, defense misconduct as a basis for a mis-
trial lends itself to abuse. The judge who rules that
defense counsel's actions necessitate a mistrial
could be trying to prevent an unfair acquittal
which is not reviewable on appeal." A declaration
of mistrial which is based on the judge's perception
that counsel has acted improperly could simply be
a mask for the judge's opinion that there is a strong
possibility that the jury intends to acquit a defend-
ant that the judge believes is guilty.
The necessity for such mistrial rulings, based on
improper conduct by the defense attorney, was
recognized by the Court in United States v. Jorn:
"Unquestionably an important factor to be consid-
ered is the need to hold litigants on both sides to
standards of responsible professional conduct in
the clash of an adversary criminal process."' 8 Ad-
mittedly, the courts must have the authority to
prevent the defendant's attorney from seeking to
prejudice the jury unfairly. However, the possibil-
ity of the abuse of such power by the judge would
indicate a need for a standard of review closer to
that of cases involving judicial or prosecutorial
overreaching, rather than the deference accorded
ajudge's determination that a hung jury is unable
to reach a fair verdict.
The Court's opinion in Arizona appears to be in
line with two recent trends in Supreme Court cases.
First, the Court has given increasing deference to
46 Id
17 In Fong Foo v. United States, 368 U.S. 141 (1962),
the Court held that a verdict of acquittal in a criminal
case could not be reviewed by an appellate court without
offending the double jeopardy clause regardless of how
erroneous was the basis for the acquittal.
48400 U.S. at 485-86.
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state court rulings which implicate issues of state
policy and the orderly process of its courts. For
instance, this deference formed the basis for the
ruling in Illinois v. Somerville,49 where the manifest
necessity for a mistrial was caused by a state policy
disallowing mid-trial amendments of indictments.
In that case, the Supreme Court specifically in-
cluded the implementation of a reasonable state
policy in its balancing test. 5°
Second, the Supreme Court has shown increas-
ing reluctance to give defendants the benefit of
trial errors under the double jeopardy prohibition.
In United States v. Scott,5 1 another case decided dur-
ing this term, the Court held that the government
was entitled to appeal the mid-trial dismissal of an
indictment as long as the dismissal was not based
on a factual resolution relating to the actual guilt
or innocence of the defendant. According to the
Court, the double jeopardy clause was not offended
despite the fact that if the government prevailed
on appeal, a retrial would be necessitated.5 2 This
case overruled United States v. Jenkins,53 which had
established that the double jeopardy prohibition
barred appeal from a dismissal of an indictment
where retrial would necessitate the resolution of
any factual elements of the offense. By overruling
Jenkins, the Court in Scott broadened the govern-
ment's right to appeal in situations where the judge
had made a possibly erroneous ruling in favor of
the defendant. Arizona v. Washington, in applying a
less exacting standard of review to the question of
the necessity for mistrials, allows judges a greater
measure of freedom in terminating a trial when
there has been a trial error favoring the defendant.
By extending a less exacting standard of review
to cases of mistrial based on a defense attorney's
improper conduct, the Arizona Court has also low-
ered the constitutional status of the defendant's
right to have his trial completed before a single
4 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
o A trial judge properly exercises his discretion to
declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be
reached or if a verdict of conviction could be
reached, but would have to be reversed on appeal
due to an obvious procedural error in the trial. If an
error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, it
would not serve "the ends of public justice" to
require that the Government proceed with its proof
when it succeeded before the jury, it would auto-
maticallly be stripped of that success by an appel-
late court.
410 U.S. at 464.
5198 S. Ct. 2187 (1978).
uId. at 2191.
53 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
tribunal. 54 This may possibly indicate that in the
future this right will continue to be restricted at
the expense of the government's right to an error-
free trial. The second major case decided in this
term involving the defendant's right to trial before
a single tribunal indicates a similar direction.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A Two-TIERED TRIAL
SYSTEM IN JUVENILE COURTS
In Swisher v. Brady,ss the Court addressed the
contention that the Maryland Juvenile Court sys-
tem is unconstitutional because it allows the state
to take exceptions from a master's proposed finding
of non-delinquency and demand a hearing on the
record before a supervising Juvenile Court judge.
The Court held that this type of system does not
offend the double jeopardy constraint against sec-
ond trials.
In the Maryland Juvenile Court system, the vast
majority of the cases begin with an adjudicatory
hearing before a master.' The master's findings
are then accepted, rejected or remanded with rec-
ommendations by a supervising judge. If the state
or the juvenile desire, they may take exceptions,
and, until 1975, could demand a hearing de novo
before the judge.
In the instant case, after the state took exceptions
to the master's finding of non-delinquency for three
of the petitioners, the supervising judge ruled on
their motion to dismiss the exceptions. Ruling in
favor of dismissal, the judge declared that the
system of allowing the state to take exceptions to
the master's recommendation of acquittal offended
the prohibition against double jeopardy. On ap-
peal,5 7 the Maryland Special Court of Appeals
overturned the lower court ruling on the ground
" An analogous situation has developed in equal pro-
tection cases. In that area, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a rule that the more disfavored a classification, the
stricter the scrutiny to which it is subjected. See Craig v.
Boren, 423 U.S. 1047 (1976) and discussion in dissenting
and concurring opinions.
"98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
56 The district court in Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp.
1161, 1170 (D. Md. 1975), a case involving the same
issues but different juvenile petitioners, noted that in
1974, 5,345 adjudicatory hearings were held in the Bal-
timore Juvenile Court before the masters and only 327
were heard before the judges. Furthermore, the total of
cases heard before judges included cases previously heard
by masters to which the state or the juvenile took excep-
tion, demanding a de novo hearing before the judge.
57 Under the recent ruling in United States v. Scott,
98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978), the government may appeal in
criminal cases from a judge's ruling dismissing the case
as long as the basis for the dismissal is not one which
involves the actual innocence of the accused.
(Vol. 69
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that there was only one continuing trial in the
Baltimore system and that the defendant was
therefore only placed in jeopardy once.:8 The ju-
veniles then appealed, and the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed on a different basis.59 The Court
held thaL jeopardy failed to attach at the master's
hearing, since the master had no judicial power. 0
Having exhausted their state remedies, the ju-
veniles petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus.6 t The district court in Aid-
ridge v. Dean dismissed the case as to the three
petitioners involved in the present Supreme Court
case on considerations of ripeness, because no hear-
ing by the judge on the state's exceptions had yet
taken place. However, with respect to the remain-
ing petitioners, the court granted the writ and
declared that the Maryland system violated due
process because it subjected juveniles to a second
trial after a finding of acquittal. The court held
that double jeopardy attached at the time of the
master's hearing. The court reasoned that a mas-
ter's hearing was identical in form and substance
to those adjudicatory hearings initially held before
the supervising juvenile court judge rather than
before a masteres The court then found that allow-
ing the state to present exceptions and obtain a de
novo hearing performed the same function and was
subject to the same abuses as a state appeal from
an acquittal by a criminal court.6
Subsequent to the decision in Aldridge v. Dean,
the Maryland Court of Appeals amended its rules
to provide that the state could take exceptions to
a master's findings but that it was not entitled to
a hearing on the record before the supervising
judge unless the juvenile agreed to a hearing de
novo.6' It was under this new rule that the district
In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540
(1974).
0 In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516 (1974).
'Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is
impaneled and sworn. In a bench trial,jeopardy attaches
when the judge begins to hear evidence. The doctrine of
early attachment is a direct outgrowth of the defendant's
right to a trial before a single tribunal, and was held to
apply to the states in Crist v. Bretz, 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978).
2156 (1978).
61 Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975).
6 Id. at 1172-73. The district court noted that origi-
nally the cases involving serious violence were heard by
a judge rather than a master. Recently, however, due to
an increasing case load, cases involving serious violence
are frequently heard by masters. The court felt that this
fact supported its contention that the masters were indeed
independent factfinders. Id at 1170.
6aid at 1173.
r The present rule reads as follows:
court entertained the class action of Brady v.
Swisher, s which sought an injunction declaring the
Maryland law unconstitutional. The court issued
the injunction and based its finding on the fact
that though the master's findings were not final
and the state could not present its evidence anew,
a. Authority
1. Detention of Shelter Care.
A master is authorized to order detention or
shelter care in accordance with Rule 912 (Deten-
tion or Shelter Care) subject to an immediate
review by a judge if requested by any party.
2. Other Matters
A master is authorized to hear any cases and
matters assigned to him by the court, except a
hearing on a waiver petition. The findings, con-
clusions and recommendations of a master do
not constitute orders or final action of the court.
b. Report to the Court.
Within ten days following the conclusion of a
disposition hearing by a master, he shall transmit to
the judge the entire file in the case, together with a
written report of his proposed findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, recommendations and proposed
orders with respect to adjudication and disposition.
A copy of his report and proposed order shall be
served upon each party as provided by Rule 306
(Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed.
Any party may file exceptions to the master's
proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or
proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed
with the clerk within five days after the master's
report is served upon the party, and shall specify
those items to which the party excepts, and whether
the hearing is to be de novo or on the record. A copy
shall be served upon all other parties pursuant to
Rule 906 (Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).
Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing
shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting
party other than the State may elect a hearing de
novo or a hearing on the record. If the State is the
excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record,
supplemented by such additional evidence as the
judge considers relevant and to which the parties
raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall
be limited to those matters to which exceptions have
been taken.
d. Review by Court in Absence of Exceptions.
In the absence of timely and proper exceptions,
the master's proposed findings of fact, conclusions
of law and recommendations may be adopted by
the court and the proposed or other appropriate
orders may be entered based on them. The court
may remand the case to the master for further
hearings, or may, on its own motion, schedule and
conduct a further hearing relevant and to which the
parties raise no objection. Action by the court under
this section shall be taken within two days after the
expiration of the time for filing exceptions.
Rule 911, MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE (1970).
0 Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977).
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the juvenile was placed in jeopardy a second time
at the hearing on the record before the supervising
judge.6
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, agreed with the
district court that the juvenile was placed in jeop-
ardy at the adjudicatory hearing before the mas-
ter.' The Court reasoned, however, that the pro-
ceeding before the master did not end until the
entry of judgment by the supervising judge and
that, therefore, the proceeding was one whole and
not subject to double jeopardy objections. The
Court pointed out that none of the reasons behind
the right of a defendant to have his case heard and
decided by a single tribunal were implicated in
this situation.68 The state was only allowed to
present its evidence once and therefore was unable
to refine or strengthen it. There was no enhance-
ment of a risk that an innocent defendant would
be convicted since there was only one adjudicator
empowered by the state as a factfinder-that being
the supervising judge. Finally, because the hearing
was on the record and because thejuvenile's attor-
ney rarely even appeared, this type of proceeding
could not have been used to harrass, embarrass or
subject the defendant to the expense of a second
trial.69
The Court distinguished this type of system from
the one in Breed v. Jones,70 in which the Court first
applied the constitutional prohibition against dou-
ble jeopardy to state juvenile courts. The Court
pointed out that Breed involved two distinct trials
before two judges, both of whom were empowered
to enter a final acquittal. In the situation at hand,
the Court found only one continuous proceeding,
culminating only when a final judgment was en-
tered by the supervising juvenile court judge.
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and
joined in by Justices Powell and Brennan, argued
vehemently that the Maryland system did not
employ one continuous proceeding but rather was
analogous to an appeal by the state of a criminal
6Id. at 1369.
67 98 S. Ct. at 2706 n.12.
8 Id.
'0 355 U.S. at 187.
7" 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Breed involved a situation where
a juvenile was first subjected to an adjudicatory hearing
in juvenile court to determine whether he had violated
any criminal statutes, after which he was found unfit for
treatment as a juvenile. He was then brought to trial as
an adult. The Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy prohibition applied to juvenile court and that
California had violated the provision by subjecting the
accused to two trials for the same offense.
conviction.71 In support of their conclusion, the
dissenters pointed out that the master performed a
fact finding function and that unless the state
raised exceptions, the master's judgment was vir-
tually "rubber stamped" by the supervising
judge.72 The dissent felt that the Court had
adopted a "continuing jeopardy" argument which
was indistinguishable from that employed by Jus-
tice Holmes in his dissent to Kepner v. United States.
73
As the dissent pointed out, this argument has been
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court as the
basis for state appeals of acquittals in criminal
74
cases.
The dissent argued, secondarily, that even if the
Maryland system did not offend the double jeop-
ardy clause, it was offensive to due process because
it permitted ajudge who did not hear the evidence
first hand to enter the ultimate verdict. The dissent
cited Holiday v. Johnston75 for the importance of
hearing live witnesses rather than ruling from a
cold record.
As the dissent recognized, the right of a defend-
ant to have his trial conducted by a single discrete
tribunal is implicated in this decision. While this
right is most often cited in connection with mis-
trials, the justification for such a rule also applies
to situations involving bifurcated trial systems such
as the one under consideration in Swisher. The rule
is an attempt to protect a criminal defendant
against undue harassment, anxiety and expense at
the hands of the state. 6 It also prevents the state
from refining and strengthening evidence. Finally,
it prohibits prosecutorial "judgeshopping" in an
attempt to find a judge who is favorable to the
prosecutor's case.7 All such practices enhance the
likelihood that a state, with its superior resources,
may obtain the conviction of an innocent person.
78
However, the Court in Swisher v. Brady addressed
71 98 S. Ct. at 2709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 "The District Court found that, except when the
state filed an exception, all of the masters' recommended
findings of non-delinquency had been approved by the
judge." 98 S. Ct. at 2711 n.5.
195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned that double jeopardy was
not implicated in appeals from conviction by the govern-
ment because the initial jeopardy only ended when there
had been "a final judgment in the court of last resort."
195 U.S. at 134.
74 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. at 534.
75 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
76 355 U.S. at 187.
7 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
78 Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88. This is especially likely
in the case ofajuvenile who often will not have even the
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these objections to trial before more than one tri-
bunal and concluded that they were not implicated
by the Maryland system.
First, the Court found that there would be no
undue harassment, anxiety or expense resulting
from the fact that the juvenile's attorney need not
even appear before the judge at the second hear-
ing.79 However, in Downun v. United States,so the
Court had held that a mistrial which involved a
mere two day delay and no repetition of evidence,
since witnesses had not yet been heard, could not
be justified on the grounds of manifest necessity.
Furthermore, the Court in Swisher failed to consider
the anxiety or harassment engendered simply by
the choice of the state to prolong the defendant's
uncertainty by taking exceptions to the master's
finding of non-delinquency, a finding which the
juvenile certainly hoped would put an end to his
ordeal.
As the Court correctly noted, Maryland's modi-
fied procedure does not directly offend the policy
against allowing the state to strengthen its evidence
by presenting it to a second tribunal, since the
Maryland system now allows only a review on the
record by the judge unless the juvenile consents to
a hearing de novo.81 This, as the dissent pointed
out, raises an additional question of due process.
The Court incorrectly failed to consider the due
process issue, basing its failure to do so on an
assertion that any due process objections to such a
system do not arise from the guarantees of the
double jeopardy clause.s8
However, North Carolina v. Pearceso is directly to
the contrary. The Pearce Court, in deciding the
constitutionality of the imposition of a heavier
sentence in a conviction on retrial following a
successful appeal, held that a defendant cannot be
forced to choose between constitutional rights. Yet,
in future situations mandated by the Swisher hold-
ing, the juveniles acquitted by a master under the
Maryland system will be forced into just such an
unfair choice. If they do not waive their double
jeopardy protection against giving the prosecution
a second chance to present its case, then they will
be forced to accept the findings of ajudge who has
not heard any of the evidence nor had an oppor-
level of resources of an adult and to whom the govern-
ment presents an even more intimidating figure.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2707.
"o 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
at 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977).
82. 8 S. Ct. at 2707 n.14.
83395 U.S. 711 (1969).
tunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
Surely such a procedure raises grave due process
objections. Furthermore, the importance of such
live hearings have been stressed by the Court re-
peatedly. In Arizona v. Washington, 4 for example,
the court used the opportunity of the trial judge to
hear the arguments and evidence first hand as a
basis for a high degree of deference to his judgment.
But, in Brady, the Court appears to have forgotten
the Arizona concern despite its recent nature.
Moreover, due process considerations cannot be
divorced from an analysis of the constitutionality
of a juvenile court system. Beginning with In re
Gault,s5 the Court has applied constitutional pro-
tections to juvenile courts only where it feels due
process requires that juveniles be accorded certain
rights8 6 Thus, any consideration of double jeop-
ardy in a juvenile court setting necessarily impli-
cates considerations of due process!' The Mary-
land system, which requires the juvenile to choose
between having his fate decided by a judge on a
cold record or allowing the state an opportunity to
strengthen its evidence by a second presentation,
does not meet the due process standards set forth
in Gault.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Mary-
land system does not allow the state an opportunity
to convince a second factfinder after failing to do
so at the first hearing, because the Maryland law
gives the master no authority. Therefore, the Court
reasoned, the master is not a factfinder. 88 This
Court reasoning, though, exemplifies the type of
technicality that the court abjured in Arizona v.
84434 U.S. at 510-11.
85 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The right extended to juveniles
by the Court in this case was the protection against self-
incrimination.
' McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
81 In Gault, the Court, after extended discussion of the
failings ofjuvenile court systems, concluded that the lack
of due process protection for minors could no longer be
tolerated on the tenuous basis that the proceedings were
civil and not criminal in nature, or that the state was
acting as parens patria and not as an adversary. 387 U.S.
at 16. However, the Court did not require that juvenile
delinquincy hearings be procedurally equivalent to adult
criminal trials. 387 U.S. at 30. Instead, the Court dis-
cussed each procedural safeguard separately and ana-
lyzed whether a due process standard required that the
juvenile system be altered to incorporate that particular
safeguard. The issues presented and resolved in Gault
were the juveniles right to counsel, notice of charges,
freedom from self-incrimination, and confrontation and
cross examination of witnesses.
8 98 S. Ct. at 2707.
1978]
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE SINGLE TRIBUNAL
Washington as a basis for resolving double jeopardy
issues. The state trial judge, who originally ruled
that the system he supervised offended the double
jeopardy provision, stated that:
[lit is impossible for the Judge .... who also carries
a full docket of cases himself, to exercise any inde-
pendent, meaningful judgment in the overwhelming
majority of the many thousands of Master's orders
put before him each year.... With this being the
case it is difficult to see how realistically a Master
can be called only an adviser.... The Master con-
ducts for all intents and purposes, full blown and
complete proceedings through the adjudicatory and
dispositional phases and ... as a practical matter he
imposes sanctions and can effectively deprive young-
sters of their freedom.89
The Court in Swisher, however, in failing to take
account of the realities of the system, ignored the
important considerations that the master's role was
exactly analogous to that of the judge in the few
cases where the judge conducted the initial hear-
ing.9°
The Court based its finding that there is only a
single adjudication before a single tribunal on a
theory of "continuity of the proceedings." Again,
though, a similar theory was rejected by the Court
in Kepner v. United States' and has been most re-
cently rejected in a juvenile setting in Breed v.
Jones.92 The Court in Swisher attempted to distin-
guish these two cases by pointing out that the
master under the Maryland court rules had no
power to enter a final judgment. However, the
Court's attempt does not sufficiently deal with the
Kepner case since under Philippine law, a person
was not regarded as being in jeopardy in the legal
sense until there had been a final judgment in the
court of last resort. The lower courts were deemed
examining courts, having preliminary jurisdiction,
and the accused was not finally convicted or ac-
quitted until the case had been passed upon by the
audencia, or supreme court. 93 In both Breed and
Kepner, the state argued that there was a continuing
jeopardy, based on its own characterization of its
system. The major distinction from these cases thus
seems to be that the Maryland courts passed their
characterization of their system into law.
89 Id. at 2711 n.5.
so In Aldridge, 395 F. Supp. 1161, the court noted that
in both cases witnesses were called and sworn and evi-
dence was introduced and since the revision of the Mary-
land Code in 1975, both hearings before a judge and
those before a master are recorded.
91 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
92421 U.S. 519 (1975).
195 U.S. at 121.
Nineteen states presently have master systems
much like that of Maryland.' These systems have
now been exonerated from the charge that they
offend the double jeopardy provision of the Con-
stitution. However, many states, such as Ohio, still
allow the prosecutor to demand a de novo hearing
after a recommendation of acquittal by the mas-
ter.95 The reasoning employed by the Court in
Swisher would seem to indicate that such a system
would violate double jeopardy constraints. How-
ever, the Court did not explicity so hold and did
not explicity affirm Aldridge v. Dean, where the
district court held that such a system did violate
double jeopardy rights. Therefore, the matter re-
mains open to further litigation.
Also, some states, such as Kentucky, employ a
two-tiered system of inferior and superior criminal
courts. The Supreme Court in Colten v. Kentucky
96
held that such systems are not in violation of the
double jeopardy clause because the state is not
allowed to appeal from the inferior court's ruling.
It appears possible that by changing the nomencla-
ture of the factfinders in such a system, the state
could give itself the right to appeal from criminal
convictions in the inferior courts. This possibility
merely serves to emphasize the dangers arising
from the Court's restriction of the defendant's right
to a trial before a single tribunal.
CONCLUSION
The important constitutional right to trial before
a single tribunal, implicated in the doublejeopardy
provisions of the fifth amendment, has been rele-
gated to a position of lesser importance by the
Court's Swisher and Arizona rulings this term. By
4 ALA. CODE § 12-15-6 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.075 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. §8-231 (Supp. 1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-408,409,440 (1977); CAL. WELF. &
INST. Code §§ 247-52 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-110 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 10, §921 (1974);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-701 (1976); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-29 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.025-029 (Vernon
Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §43-236.01 (1974); NEV.
REV. STAT. §62.090 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:4-12
(1952); N.D. CENT. CODE §27-20-07 (1974); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.16 (Page 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1126 (West Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-
301 (Purdon Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-207
(1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-75 (1974). Several of
these states do not explicitly provide for the taking of
exceptions by the state. However, none of the statutes
clearly prohibits state appeal from the master's or ref-
eree's findings. Given the ruling in Brady, the state courts
may decide that exceptions by the state are acceptable.
9 5 OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.16 (Page 1968).
96407 U.S. 104 (1972).
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allowing a more lenient standard of review in
determining whether the trial court's declaration
of mistrial was manifestly necessary, especially in
situations arising out of defense counsel's miscon-
duct, the Court in Arizona v. Washington opened the
door to the abuse of such mistrial rulings byjudges
who perceive the possibility of acquittal of a de-
fendant they believe is guilty. Additionally, in
Swisher v. Brady, the Court indicated that it is
willing to allow states to subvert the defendant's
right to trial before a single factfinder by technical
designations which only disguise the underlying
reality of a system which allows state appeal from
criminal acquittals. Therefore, while Arizona merely
weakens the defendant's right to a single trial by
endorsing a less stringent standard of review in
dealing with certain exceptions to that right,
Swisher calls into question the future viability of
the right. Even under the new Arizona standard,
flagrant abuses by the lower courts of the mistrial
exception are unlikely to go uncorrected by the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, the very exis-
teisee of the right to a single trial before a single
factfinder is undermined by the Court's sanction
of a trial system, such as the one in Swisher, which
allows a state to take exceptions. The Court in
Swisher significantly decreased double jeopardy
protection on the basis of a technical distinction.
